"Am I therefore become your enemy,because I TELL YOU THE TRUTH...?"
(Galatians 4:16)

The Tripartite Threat of Radical Islam to Europe

After the 2004 Madrid bombings, the 2005 London attacks, and the myriad terrorist plots thwarted over the last few years, commentators and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have come to the realization that Europe faces an enormous challenge from terrorism of Islamist inspiration. Yet terrorism is only the tip of the iceberg, the most visible manifestation of a larger problem. Europe faces today a tripartite threat from radical Islam, of which the terrorist is only the most immediate and evident, but not necessarily the most dangerous one.
The European Islamist Pyramid
This tripartite threat can be visualized as a pyramid. At the top of it are the violent jihadists, a few thousand individuals scattered throughout the continent who openly challenge the societies they live in, and are willing to spill blood to achieve their goals. Below them are what can be defined "peaceful revolutionaries," groups and networks that openly express their opposition to any system of government that does not strictly conform to shari'a (Islamic law), yet do not, at least openly, directly resort to violent means to further their agenda. Finally, the base, the largest section of the pyramid, is occupied by groups that publicly purport to support democracy and the integration of Muslim communities within the European mainstream, but quietly work to radicalize Europe's Muslim population.Each of these aspects of radical Islam has a different presence, structure and modus operandi. Each, consequently, presents a different kind of challenge to European policymakers and intelligence agencies. And while Europeans are finally paying attention to the jihadist threat and have devised solutions to contain it, there is only a limited understanding of the other two threats.
The Jihadists
Individuals that espouse the most militant interpretation of Islam began to establish a presence in Europe in the mid-1980s. Their numbers were reinforced at the end of the decade and during the first years of the 1990s, as small groups of so-called Afghan Arabs and other committed jihadists who escaped prosecution (or worse) in the Middle East and North Africa settled in Europe. Exploiting the freedoms of the West, these violent Islamists continued to support their groups' activities in their countries of origin through propaganda, fundraising, and recruitment. Europe constituted the ideal logistical base for groups such as the Egyptian Gamaa Islamiya or the Algerian GIA (and then the GSPC), which established extensive networks throughout the continent.By the second half of the 1990s these groups and networks began to gravitate toward the orbit of al-Qaeda, embracing its message of global jihad. It was in places such as Bosnia, Chechnya, and, of course, Afghanistan, that jihadist groups from various countries made contact and decided to join forces, fighting not only against their traditional enemies (regimes in the Muslim world), but also against "the far enemy," i.e. the West.A key role in this cross-pollination of ideas and methods among jihadist groups was played by some of Europe's most radical mosques, such as London's Finsbury Park, Milan's Islamic Cultural Institute, Vienna's Sahaba, or Hamburg's al-Quds, which became popular meeting points for radicals from all countries. These networks that had long operated independently in Europe soon became franchises for al-Qaeda on the continent, significantly contributing men, funds, and logistics to the group's growth.Over the last few years, there has been a generational change in jihadist networks. Most of today's jihadists, particularly in northern European countries, are second-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe (with a small but significant number of converts).Today we can visualize the reality of jihadist networks in Europe as a continuum. At one extreme, we find homegrown groups: small clusters of mostly European-born radicals with no ties to external groups that act in absolute operational independence. At the opposite side of the spectrum, we see compartmentalized cells contained in a well-structured network and subjected to a hierarchical structure, as was the model of jihadist groups operating in Europe in the 1990s.In between these two extremes there is a whole spectrum of realities, positioned according to the level of autonomy of the group. The most recurring model seems to be that of the July 7, 2005, London bombers: a small group of young men, most of whom were born and raised in Europe, who know each other either from the mosque or from the neighborhood, and who become radicalized in Europe. Only a few of these locally groomed jihadists travel abroad to gain from various al-Qaeda affiliate groups the necessary bomb-making expertise that will make the group jump from an amateurish cluster of friends to a full-fledged terrorist cell.The challenge posed by jihadist networks, wherever they sit on the continuum, is daunting. While in the past these networks were largely focused on supporting activities taking place outside of the continent, today they consider Europe a primary target. Since 9/11, European intelligence agencies, often assisted by their American counterparts, have dismantled scores of networks and prevented dozens of terrorist attacks. Most European countries have also made significant changes to their legislation to deal more effectively with terrorism, though in some cases improvements are still needed.Looking ahead, the task faced by European authorities is overwhelming. In Britain alone, MI5 believes that there are around 4,000 terror suspects and 200 jihadist networks spread throughout the country. Intelligence officials believe that smaller but comparable numbers of jihadists operate in other European countries, even in traditionally "quiet" areas such as Scandinavia and Eastern Europe.

As in the days of Noah....